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We analyze the development of the Swedish ownership model after World War II. The 
controlling ownership in Swedish firms is typically concentrated to one or two owners. Often, 
but not always, the controlling owners are Swedish families. Thus, the model resembles the 
typical corporate control model of Continental Europe. A distinguishing feature of the 
Swedish model is that control is typically based on a smaller capital base than in other 
European countries. This feature is a result of a seemingly paradoxical policy concerning 
private ownership. Tax policy has consistently disfavored the accumulation of private wealth, 
but at the same time corporate law has greatly facilitated the wielding of control based on a 
small equity base. 
Our analysis shows that the large gap between ownership and control makes the Swedish 
corporate control model both politically and economically unstable.  
The major political threat to date has been the proposal of the Swedish Trade Union 
Congress (the LO) and the Social Democratic Party to introduce a scheme that would result in 
the gradual takeover of the Swedish corporate sector by union-controlled wage-earner funds.  
After the political defeat of this proposal in the 1980’s economic policy was changed in a 
more market liberal direction. This policy change has uncovered the economic instability of 
the model. The weak financial base of the controlling owners makes it difficult for them to 
take an active part in the current international restructuring of the corporate sector. Two forces 
are now seen as the major threat to the Swedish ownership model: (a) a rapidly increasing 
foreign takeover of Swedish firms and (b) large state and corporatist pension funds. Their 
financial assets are far larger than those of today’s dominant control owners and extensive 
mandatory and/or tax-favored systems for pensions saving ascertain that their relative 
financial strength will continue to grow sharply in the future.   2 
 
 
Table of Contents 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1.  Framework and outline 
 
2. Historical  background 
 
3.  The Swedish Corporate Control Model and Its role in the Corporatist Model 
3.1.  Ideological background 
3.2.  Reinforcing policies 
3.3.  Resulting ownership and control structure 
3.4.  The first attack on the model: The wage-earner funds proposal 
 
4.  A New Regulatory Environment 
 
5.  Ownership and Control through the Late 1990s 
 
6.  The Swedish Ownership Model at the Crossroads 
 
7.  The Future Ownership Model: Obstacles and Challenges 
 













There has been a dramatic change in the ownership structure in Swedish firms in the last few 
decades. The most obvious change is a strong increase in foreign ownership of Swedish firms. 
Naturally, this is part of a general trend towards globalization. But foreign ownership has 
increased more in Sweden than in other developed industrial countries. This has led to 
considerable changes in the ownership and operation of some of the largest and most 
important firms. The effects of Swedish and foreign ownership as well as the reasons for the 
swift increase in foreign ownership of Swedish industry has also ensued. We aim at throwing 
some light on these issues, while taking a wider perspective on the issue of ownership.  
 
The conditions for corporate governance in Sweden are currently undergoing a profound 
change, brought about by several different factors. In the literature, there is a strong tendency 
to focus on corporate law as a determining factor of the system of corporate governance in a 
country (La Porta et al., 1998, 1999). The analysis in this paper will show that this focus is 
too narrow. 
 
We examine the ”Swedish ownership model”, which implies that the controlling ownership in 
firms is typically concentrated to one or two owners. Often, but not always, these owners are 
Swedish families. Regarding controlling ownership, the Swedish ownership model thus 
resembles the predominant corporate governance model on the European continent. Sweden 
differs from most countries in Continental Europe in a couple of respects, however. First, the 
entire ownership on the stock exchange is predominated by a few controlling owners. Second, 
Swedish controlling ownership is based on a smaller capital base than that in other 
Continental European countries.  
 
No other industrial country has such a large gap between cash-flow rights and control rights 
as Sweden. This is the result of a seemingly paradoxical policy regarding private ownership. 
Tax policies have consistently discouraged the accumulation of private wealth in the postwar 
period, while corporate law has favored those wishing to obtain controlling ownership on the 
basis of a limited equity base.  
 
Sweden appears to have found a model combining strong owners and an egalitarian wealth 
policy. But as we shall see, the large gap between ownership of capital and control creates   2 
 
 
considerable problems for the Swedish model. In the long run, this might mean that it is 
phased out in order to be partly or entirely replaced by other models of corporate governance. 
The weak supply of capital makes the Swedish model both politically and financially 
unstable.  
 
The major political threat to the model before the 1990s was the proposal in the early 1970s to 
introduce wage-earner funds. These funds were to be controlled by the trade unions and they 
would gradually by virtue of privileged equity issues gradually gain control of the business 
sector. This proposal led to a deep-seated political conflict. In fact, the conflict about the 
funds did mark the end of the political ambitions of the labor movement to nationalize 
Swedish business – at least so far.  
 
The international renaissance of the market economy in the 1980s contributed to the policy 
change in a more liberal direction after the conflict about the wage-earner funds. Capital and 
foreign exchange markets were deregulated and the tax system was reformed in the direction 
of increased neutrality between different kinds of owners and different sources of finance in 
the second half of the 1980s, and the measures that hindered foreign ownership of Swedish 
business were gradually abolished. 
 
Since the political threat against the Swedish ownership model had been averted, the new 
more market liberal order exposed the economic instability of the Swedish ownership model. 
On an internationalized stock market with new large groupings of owners, for example in the 
shape of Swedish and foreign pension funds and large international firms, incumbent 
controlling owners are often doomed to a passive role in the comprehensive restructuring 
among listed companies. A situation now emerges where firm ownership is increasingly 
dominated by Swedish and foreign funds as well as politically controlled Swedish pension 
funds. At the same time, the old Swedish control model loses in importance, in particular 
concerning the control and operation of large firms. Sweden is thus moving away from the 
Continental European model of corporate control. It might seem natural that Sweden should 
thus be on its way towards an Anglo-Saxon control model with dispersed ownership and 
management control. But in contrast to the Anglo-Saxon stock markets, the Swedish stock 
market is dominated by a few very large funds, where the largest ones have a strong political 
connection. This means that in part of the stock market, there might be a return to a socialist 




The purpose of this paper is to analyze the development of the Swedish corporate ownership 
and control model in the postwar period and how it has been shaped by political decisions, 
mainly within the areas of taxation and corporate law. We mainly study the development of 
the ownership and control structure of firms on the Swedish stock exchange. We also try to 
explain what forces have driven the observed trend.  
 
1.1.  Framework and outline 
 
We distinguish between different categories of owners: families, private institutional owners, 
public or semi-public institutional owners and foreign owners. The last group of owners can 
be divided into the same categories as domestic owners. Generally, we treat them as one 
group, however. 
 
A central issue is also whether the ownership in firms is concentrated or dispersed. The issue 
here is mainly whether one or a couple of owners can have ownership dominance, that is a 
dominant influence in each firm. Moreover, a single agent may have an influence in several 
firms due to ownership dominance. In that case, we may speak of a high concentration of 
ownership control. Controlling a firm is based on the control of a large part of the votes of the 
outstanding shares of the firm. Owning a share in a firm both means controlling a certain part 
of the votes at the general meeting of shareholders and that one has the right to a certain share 
of the total dividends of the firm. On the European continent, as well as in Sweden, it is 
common that shares have differential voting rights. Thus, the influence in a given firm needs 
not be proportional to the capital invested. The possibility of pyramid ownership also works 
in this direction.  
 
When studying ownership dominance, it is important to distinguish between cash-flow rights 
or voting rights. The aspects of ownership that we have mentioned above are summarized in 
Figure 1.  
 
The major part of our analysis deals with the postwar period. Since the end of World War II, 
ownership related to cash-flow rights has undergone dramatic changes, while control 
ownership at the stock exchange has remained surprisingly constant. However, behind this, 
there is a hidden trend where the sharp increase in foreign ownership has resulted in the   4 
 
 
disappearance of several large independent firms from the Swedish stock exchange. Several 
firms have either become wholly-owned subsidiaries of foreign multinationals or they have 
merged with a foreign competitor. The new larger firm has subsequently become domiciled 
elsewhere and delisted from the Stockholm stock exchange. 
 
At the beginning of the post-war period, ownership in Swedish listed firms was mainly 
private. There was strong ownership dominance throughout the firms. Ownership was 
concentrated to a small number of families and groupings. This concentration was both based 
on a considerable concentration of the large private fortunes and the fact that there were 
different mechanisms separating control from the number of shares owned. These 
mechanisms consist of differences in voting rights between different shares, pyramiding and 
cross ownership. 
 
These mechanisms were also used in other countries. With time, their importance has,  
become larger in Sweden than in other industrialized countries. Therefore, we may talk about 
a typical Swedish ownership model, thereby meaning a dominant and concentrated ownership 
based on a small equity base. In the period studied, the gap between the distribution of 
ownership rights and the distribution of control rights has widened, as shown in Figure 1. 
How has this trend been financed? Since the capital share among controlling owners has 
continually been decreasing, the supply of capital has increasingly come from other sources. 
Loan financing played an important part until the 1980s. Subsequently, the stock exchange 
has increased in importance as a source of financing. 
 
Apparently, the type of legislation in a country affects the kinds of management and financing 
allowed. These relations have also been frequently analyzed in the literature. The empirical 
literature has largely concentrated on the relation between ”corporate law” and ”corporate 
governance”. Seminal studies in this tradition are La Porta et al. (1998, 1999), based on a 
cross-section analysis of a large number of countries. A general result is that the legal 
framework is of crucial importance for the system of ”corporate governance” in a country and 
for the financing of the activities of the firm. 
 
One problem with their results is that they give no explanations for the considerable changes 
over time in many countries in the variables to be explained. An example from Sweden is the 
trend of the stock market capitalization as a percentage of GDP. This variable plays a crucial   5 
 
 
role in the analysis of La Porta et al. When their study was made, this value was relatively 
low, but as shown in Figure 2, it has undergone considerable changes over time, despite the 
fact that the explanatory variables used by La Porta et al. have changed only to a limited 
extent. They focussed on the legal origin as the ultimate explanation of the system of 
corporate governance for a particular country. Since the legal origin is taken as exogenous and 
time-invariant, this approach obviously cannot be used to explain large changes in the system 
of corporate governance.  
 
There is a growing literature where the regulations that shape the design and operations of 
corporations and securities markets, are seen as the outcome of a political process in each 
country. Here changes in the political environment pave the way for changes in corporate 
regulations. See Pagano and Volpin (2001) for a review. Still, the main focus here is on 
corporate law and regulations, even if these laws and regulations are explained within new 
political economy framework. 
 
We argue, with Sweden as a point of reference, that the development of ownership structures 
and systems for corporate governance can be explained by several factors, of which 
”corporate law” is one. Thus, we want to “widen” the analysis. The factors stressed  here are: 
 
•  Tax policy. This affects the conditions for ownership in a number of areas. For Sweden, it 
has affected the distribution between private and institutional wealth formation. It has 
also been of considerable importance for the relative cost to the firm of different sources 
of finance. The tax policy has also affected the size distribution of firms. This, in turn, 
might be expected to affect the types of ownership and the structure of firm financing. 
•  Financial market regulations. In the first three decades after World War II, the Swedish 
financial markets were subject to strict regulations. These regulations affected both the 
structure of ownership and financing in a number of ways. Analogously, the deregulation 
of financial markets in the 1980s had dramatic effects on these variables.  
•  Channeling of savings in the economy. The channeling of savings did affect the supply 
and demand for equity capital and credits to a large extent. In the first part of the post-war 
period, large part of the savings in the Swedish economy took place in the public sector. 
Since none of these savings were invested in shares, the importance of the stock exchange 
as a source of finance dwindled. Later, there were a number of changes in the channeling 
of savings, which contributed to an increase in the importance of the stock exchange.   6 
 
 
•  Labor market policy. The organization of the labor market is an important part of what is 
usually called “the Swedish model”. However, in this study we focus exclusively on its 
direct importance for the favoring of large firms relative to small and new firms.  
•  Corporate law. In the literature on corporate governance, the type of corporate law in a 
country is considered to be of crucial importance for its firm and ownership structure. No 
doubt, this legislation has been of considerable importance since the Companies Act 
allows dual-class shares and tax-favored investment companies quoted on the stock 
exchange. However, these rules have not been changed in a way that can explain the 
major changes in the ownership structure and the sharp increase in the importance of the 
stock exchange. 
 
The policy on ownership of firms in Sweden can be divided into two periods, where the 
proposal for wage-earners funds constitutes a natural endpoint for the first period, which was 
characterized by a long-term socialist vision. In the second period, this vision disappeared 
from the political agenda. Instead, the policy stance has been largely market liberal, but the 
tax policy has discriminated against Swedish individual ownership. A stylized survey of the 
two periods of the policy is given in Table 1. 
 
In the paper, we provide a detailed analysis of the policy and its effects on the various aspects 
of ownership structure mentioned above. The effects might be more or less certain. In many 
cases, we draw on previous studies, while in other instances we have to rely on more 
scattered evidence and economic reasoning. A summary of our analysis is presented in Table 
2. This table may also serve as an overview of the contents of the remainder of this paper. 
 
The next section provides a survey of the development of the ownership of firms since the 
beginning of the last century. Then, the policy and its effects during the period 1945–1985 
are described. The ensuing section analyzes the turning point or the transition to the second 
period. Then, we present the development after the turning point. 
 
While there have been considerable changes in a number of the variables studied here, we 
have already established that the Swedish ownership model has remained strikingly invariant 
in the long period we study. Thus, the Swedish trend might seem to be in line with traditional 
analyses of corporate governance in one important respect. One important conclusion of our 
analysis is, however, that the Swedish ownership model is not a stable  one. The other major   7 
 
 
changes that have taken place as concerns ownership have undermined the Swedish 
ownership and control model.  We argue that it is currently undermined at a rapid rate and it 
is likely to gradually disappear, at least in its traditional shape. We conclude by discussing 
likely ownership and control models in the future. 
 
The major problem for the continued existence of the Swedish ownership model is the 
increasing gap between the value of ownership wealth and the exercise of ownership control 
in Swedish firms. There is no possibility for Swedish individual wealth to exercise controlling 
ownership only through equity capital to the same extent as is done today through differential 
voting rights and pyramiding. The first great threat to the model was in the shape of a 1970s 
program for nationalizing Swedish business. The material conditions paving the way for these 
proposals were partly due to the lack of legitimacy of private ownership created by the 
concentrated corporate control structure of the Swedish business sector. The present threat to 
the model instead comes from the “market”
1.  
 
In today’s deregulated and globalized capital markets, it is no longer possible to base a 
dynamic and expansive ownership role on the thin capital base which constituted the basis for 
individual ownership and control in Sweden in the past. 
 
2.  Historical background 
 
Beginning in the late 1860s the Swedish economy embarked on a long period of 
modernization and sustained economic growth. This was greatly facilitated by a number of 
economic reforms in the mid 1860s, notably, the freedom for any Swedish man or woman to 
start a business and the liberalization of foreign trade. In 1870 the Swedish productivity level 
was the second lowest in Europe, but from 1870 to 1913 Sweden experienced the highest rate 
of productivity growth of all countries for which comparable data are available (Maddison, 
1982). A number of highly innovative entrepreneurs such as Gustaf de Laval, Alfred Nobel 
and L.-M. Ericsson were active at the time. Before World War I a number of new industries 
and important firms were created. In fact, 35 of the 50 largest Swedish firms in terms of sales 
in 2000 were established before 1914 (NUTEK and ALMI, 2001).  
 
                                                           
1 Another threat that emerged early in 2003 is the discussion within the EU to abolish differential voting rights as 
a part of a new merger and take-over directive for the single market.   8 
 
 
Foreigners had been banned from owning Swedish real estate and mines since the 19
th 
century. Restrictions for foreign owners were further extended in 1916 when new legislation 
was passed that prevented foreign owners from having more than 20 percent of the voting 
rights in Swedish corporations owning natural resources. This law mainly hit firms in mining, 
forestry, pulp and paper, and iron and steel (Glete, 1981).
2 In 1934 legislation was passed that 
outlawed earlier methods to circumvent the restrictions on foreign ownership by means of 
using a Swedish citizen as a dummy.  
 
Apart from a sharp but short-lived crisis in 1920–21, Swedish industry thrived in the 1920s; 
several of today’s large corporations were formed, and towards the late 1920s many large 
export companies raised capital through equity issues on foreign markets (Lindgren, 1987, p. 
172). These activities were severely curtailed as a result of the international stock market 
crash beginning in October 1929. The entire Swedish market for corporate control was totally 
retailored in the years following the demise of the internationally renowned Kreuger empire 
after Ivar Kreuger’s death in March 1932. Since 1911 banks had been allowed to acquire 
stocks as collateral for loans, and after the severe crises of the 1920s and 1930s banks held 
large portfolios of stock.  
 
A new bank law in 1934 prohibited banks from buying new stock and existing portfolios had 
to be sold within four years if this could be done without incurring losses. The major banks 
solved this problem by creating new holding companies, constructed as closed-end investment 
funds, whose main assets were the stocks previously held by the bank. Ownership of the 
investment companies was distributed on a pro rata basis to the owners of the respective 
banks.
3 Since these investment companies were, and still are, organized as pyramid holding 
companies with dual-class shares they immediately became important instruments for 
corporate control. 
 
Without going into details regarding what exactly happened in the aftermath of the Great 
Depression and the Kreuger crash, we may note that corporate control was highly 
concentrated at the beginning of the post-war period. This is clearly documented by Lindgren 
                                                           
2 In 1934 the law was made more restrictive so that foreign owners could not own more than 20 percent of the 
capital either. 
3 Stockholms Enskilda Bank (controlled by the Wallenberg family) started two such companies, Investor 
(originally founded in 1916 as an equity issuing company) and Providentia, Svenska Handelsbanken started 
Industrivärden and Skandinaviska Banken formed Custos.   9 
 
 
(1953) in a study based on the 1945 Swedish Census. He shows that 6–7 percent of 
shareholders controlled 65–70 percent of the stock-market value. His findings regarding 
ownership control in the largest companies (more than 500 employees) are of even greater 
interest in our context. In no less than 60 percent of the large firms, a single individual 
represented the majority of the votes at the shareholders’ general meeting. In more than 90 
percent of these firms, three or fewer owners constituted the majority at the shareholders’ 
meeting. The concentration of control was almost as high in public companies. In the 
regularly quoted firms a single individual represented the majority of the votes at the general 
meeting in 53 percent of the cases. In 85 percent of the regularly quoted firms, the two largest 
owners represented more than 50 percent of the votes.  
 
At the end of the 1940s households were still the dominant owner category. According to 
calculations by Spånt (1975), households then held 75 percent of all Swedish listed shares. 
These calculations apply to final owners, which imply that ownership by investment 
companies and other intermediate owners has been netted out. Spånt’s final owner categories 
are households, institutions and foreigners. 
 
Foreign owners became increasingly marginalized after World War II. Shortly after the onset 
of World War II foreign exchange controls were introduced. These controls entailed a number 
of measures that restricted foreign ownership of Swedish firms and property. The most 
important of these were: the acquisition of Swedish companies required central bank 
approval, no more than 20 percent of the votes or capital of a listed company could be owned 
by foreign investors (unrestricted shares), foreign banks were not allowed to establish 
branches in Sweden and foreign acquisition of real estate was subject to approval by the 
regional government. In practice, this legislation ruled out a substantial foreign ownership 
share of Swedish industry. The purpose of this legislation was openly protectionist, i.e., to 
ascertain that ”Swedish firms remain controlled by Swedish interests” (SOU 1986:23, p. 143). 
 
In 1938 a number of important changes in the tax code were introduced. Income tax rates 
were increased, all investments could be written off instantaneously, dividends were hit by 
double taxation for individual owners, but not for institutional owners. These changes 
benefited incumbent firms and owners that were not individuals. Montgomery (1946, p. 335) 
noted that this “did not encourage the formation of new firms. And the 1938 reform was more   10 
 
 
characterized by an aspiration to facilitate the consolidation of already existing firms rather 
than promoting new ventures”. 
 
In sum, by the late 1940s the control of the Swedish corporate sector was highly concentrated, 
but households was still the dominant final owner category also in terms of dividend rights. 
As shown by Glete (1994) there were several large owner groups in Swedish industry.
4 
However, already before the war, the first steps had been taken towards a tax system that 
favoured institutional ownership and drew a wedge between the scope for wealth 
accumulation for firms and their final owners. At the same time, strict legislation was in place 
that prevented foreign investors and industrialists from becoming important actors on the 
Swedish corporate scene.  
 
3.  The Swedish Corporate Control Model and Its Role in the Corporatist Model 
 
3.1 Ideological  background 
 
The Social Democrats have dominated the political scene and the policy discussion since the 
early 1930s until the present day. As a result, there is little doubt that its philosophy had a 
tremendous influence on political decisions impinging on entrepreneurs, firms, private versus 
collective ownership and the overall business climate. It is apparent that the most important 
Social Democratic thinkers have seen the large industrial corporation as the major unit of 
production. Ernst Wigforss, Minister of Finance in 1925–26 and 1932–49 and probably the 
most influential of all Social Democratic ideologues, is clear on this point. Wigforss (1956) 
argued that the then clear tendency in capitalist societies, that economies of scale favored 
large firms (Schumpeter, 1942; Galbraith, 1956), would facilitate the collectivization or 
socialization of the productive capital stock, which was seen as the ultimate goal of the labor 
movement. He also maintained that in the long run the large industrial corporations had to be 
converted into ”social enterprises without owners”. In this perspective a strong concentration 
of ownership could be seen as a natural and even desirable intermediate station on the road 
towards the ultimate goal.
5  
 
                                                           
4 The Wallenberg family, which became increasingly dominant, only controlled four out of the 25 largest firms 
in 1945 (Glete, 1994, p. 288). 
5 This point is developed at greater length in Henrekson and Jakobsson (2001).   11 
 
 
In the medium term a more pragmatic strategy was adopted by the ruling Social Democrats. 
State ownership of industry was limited and the government, trade unions and bank-related 
business groups came to constitute an explicit tripartite negotiating culture, which was the 
main characteristic of the Swedish social democratic corporatist model. This model 
presupposed the existence of a fairly small number of owners or ownership groups – i.e., an 
identifiable industrial elite, which acknowledged and accepted that by virtue of their political 
strength, the Social Democrats would use their political power to implement far-reaching 
welfare reforms, while the labor movement would abstain from socializing the industrial 
sector. It would have been very difficult to develop this culture of compromise and 
negotiations between different elites (Steinmo, 2003; Katzenstein, 1985) without the 
predominance of a few large firms and even fewer ownership groups (Reiter, 2003).  
 
Calling this arrangement an “historical compromise” (Korpi, 1982) is in our view a 
misnomer. Swenson (1991) argues in favor of the alternative interpretation that it is a case of 
coalition between an entrenched political leadership and Big Business to the detriment of the 
(educated) middle class. Roine (2000) points out one plausible explanation for this 
arrangement. He shows theoretically that if private wealth is very unequally distributed 
initially, a political coalition may arise between low-income earners and the rich. A 
prerequisite for this coalition is the introduction of safety valves/breaks in the tax system for 
those who are rich initially, so they can avoid being substantively affected by an increase in 
aggregate taxation.  
 
3.2  Reinforcing policies 
 
Now we turn to a review of the different policy instruments used to promote and underpin the 
model outlined above. The policies dealt with are: taxation, credit market and savings 
policies, labor market legislation and wage-setting arrangements. 
 
A key policy instrument in this connection was taxation. A number of channels were used. 
First, until the late 1970s taxable wealth amounted to 100 percent of the net worth of unlisted 
companies and 100 percent of the market value of listed companies. The tax rate has typically 
been 1.5 percent of taxable wealth. In practice, these rules resulted in very high real rates of 
wealth taxation on individually owned corporate assets in the 1970s and 1980s. The wealth 
tax was not deductible at the company level, so that funds required to pay the wealth tax were   12 
 
 
first subjected to the mandatory payroll tax and the relevant marginal income tax rate.
6 
Second, dividends were subject to taxation both at the corporate and individual level, which 
normally gave rise to a total tax rate on the order of 90 percent (Norrman and McLure, 1997). 
Third, high inheritance and gift taxes made it extremely expensive to transfer ownership from 
one generation to the next.
7 As shown by Du Rietz (2002) the payment of the inheritance tax 
in the 1970s typically required a withdrawal from the inherited firm corresponding to 50–60 
percent of the net worth of the company. This was often impracticable and a sellout was the 
only feasible alternative. 
 
On the other hand, capital gains taxation was designed so that it became exceptionally 
advantageous for individual owners to sell their firms. Until 1976, the taxation of long-term 
(more than 5 years) realized capital gains on shares and the sale of partnerships was 
negligible. Between 1976 and 1990, 60 percent of nominal capital gains were exempt from 
taxation for assets held more than two years.  
 
To get a full understanding of how corporate taxation can be expected to affect corporate 
ownership and financing, one needs to calculate how real rates of taxation are influenced by 
how a venture is owned and financed. Table 3 lists effective marginal tax rates for different 
combinations of ownership and sources of finance. Three categories of owners and sources of 
finance are identified, and the effective marginal tax rate was calculated assuming a pre-tax 
real rate of return of 10 percent. A negative number means that the real rate of return is 
greater after than before tax. Tax rules benefiting debt financing relative to equity financing 
and institutional relative to individual ownership can be expected to favor large, real-capital-
intensive, publicly traded and well-established firms. Obviously, this also encourages capital 
accumulation and investments in existing firms without creating conditions conducive to 
wealth formation at the individual level.  
 
Table 3 highlights four important aspects of the Swedish tax system during the postwar period 
through the 1980s. First, debt financing consistently received the most favorable treatment 
and new share issues the least. Second, retained earnings were consistently taxed at lower 
rates than newly issued equity, which favored incumbent firms relative to entrants. Third, the 
                                                           
6 Typically 7 kronor had to be withdrawn from the firm for every krona paid in wealth tax in the early 1980s. 
7 In the late 1970s every krona to be paid in inheritance tax entailed a payment of a total of roughly 10 kronor in 
taxes, if the heirs had to withdraw the necessary funds from their firm.    13 
 
 
taxation of households as owners was much higher than for other categories, and their rate of 
taxation increased during the 1960s and 1970s, whereas the reverse occurred for insurance 
companies and tax-exempt institutions.
8 From some point in the 1960s until the 1991 tax 
reform, more than 100 percent of the real rate of return was taxed away for a household 
buying a newly issued share. Fourth, tax-exempt institutions benefit from a large tax 
advantage relative to the other two categories of owners, and this advantage increased 
strongly during the 1960s and 1970s. 
A high aggregate savings and investment rate was an essential part of Swedish economic 
policy during the first decades of the postwar period (Bergström, 1982). But achieving a high 
rate of aggregate savings without strong economic incentives to private individual wealth 
accumulation was not possible without a number of additional measures such as large 
surpluses in the public sector and a highly regulated credit market. Throughout the postwar 
period until the mid 1980s, Swedish capital market policy was aimed at low interest rates for 
favored sectors of the economy. The credit volume to the industrial sector was generally 
subjected to quantitative restrictions and the rate of interest was also regulated, which resulted 
in a situation of virtually continuous credit rationing. This set of regulations clearly favored 
credit access by larger, older, firmly established firms and by real capital-intensive firms with 
ready sources of collateral (see Jonung, 1994). Moreover, well-established links to banks was 
a clear advantage, and the two major ownership spheres groups (the Wallenberg group and 
Industrivärden) were both closely tied to a large bank. 
 
The capital market policy necessitated a number of measures to ensure a sufficient level of 
savings. The mandatory national pension system (ATP) instituted in 1960 transformed the 
public sector into the most important supplier of credit. Large surpluses were accumulated in 
the national pension funds, the so-called AP funds. In the early 1970s, the AP funds 
accounted for 35 percent of total credit supply (Pontusson, 1992). The decision to accumulate 
savings to such a great extent in the AP funds led to a massive further institutionalization of 
savings, which can be expected to have benefited large, well-established firms with a good 
credit rating that could operate on a high debt-equity ratio.
9 The AP fund system also 
benefited incumbents through the so-called ”lending back” system (återlån) based on the rule 
                                                           
8 By definition tax-exempt institutions  pay no tax on interest receipts, dividends or capital gains. This category 
includes charities, scientific and cultural foundations, foundations for employee recreation set up by companies, 
pension funds for supplementary occupational pension schemes, and the National Pension Fund (the AP Fund).    14 
 
 
that employers were allowed to borrow up to half the amount they had paid in to the fund 
during the previous year. The potential for using this credit channel was therefore 
proportional to the wage bill of the firm. This type of lending was abolished in 1987.  
 
The structure of the Swedish tax and pension system reduced incentives for individual wealth 
accumulation in general, not only in the form of corporate assets. As shown in Table 4 
Swedish household savings was exceptionally low by international comparison through the 
1980s. Since the availability of equity financing is a critical factor for both start-ups and the 
expansion of incumbent firms’ equity (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998; Lindh and Ohlsson, 
1996; Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian and Rosen, 1994), this can be expected to contribute to a low 
prevalence of startups and high-growth firms. 
 
Labor market legislation was changed in a number of respects in the first half of the 1970s, 
aiming at giving labor direct influence on corporate decision making were passed. Prime 
examples are union representation on corporate boards of directors and the Codetermination 
Act of 1976 (see Pontusson, 1992). Moreover, the Employment Security Act (LAS) from 1974 
gives employees extensive protection against dismissal. The only legal grounds for dismissal 
are gross misconduct and redundancies. In the latter case, LAS stipulates a ”last in – first out 
principle”.  
 
Strict employment security provisions and formalized labor influence on managerial decisions 
are likely to be more harmful for small and potentially fast-growing employers than for large, 
well-established firms. For many firms – and in particular for firms with a good growth 
potential in terms of productivity and employment – there is a great need for flexibility both 
to increase the number of employees in response to rising demand and likewise to be able to 
rapidly contract when demand falls short of expectations. The road from small to large for a 
fast-growing firm, a gazelle (Birch and Medoff, 1994), is far from straight, since the activities 
of new firms in particular are subject to genuine uncertainty (Davis et al., 1996; Brown and 
Medoff, 1989). If, under such circumstances, rules are imposed that reduce the firms’ leeway 
to rapid adjustment, one should expect both a lower willingness to expand in general and that 
fewer firms, despite a good product or a viable idea, grow from small to large in a short 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
9 The gradual introduction of mandatory supplementary pension schemes can be expected to have the same 




10 In addition, a strictly applied “last in – first out“ principle in case of 
redundancies implies that tenure at the present employer becomes relatively more important 
for labor security than individual skill and productivity. This fact increases the individual’s 
opportunity cost of changing employers or of leaving a secure salaried job to start a business. 
 
As documented in many studies – see, e.g., Edin and Topel (1997) and Davis and Henrekson 
(2000) – the Swedish wage negotiation system produced a very narrow wage dispersion and 
high relative wages for low productivity workers. At the same time, numerous studies show 
that the wage level increases with the size, age and capital intensity of the firm (e.g., Brown 
and Medoff, 1989). By implication, the Swedish wage negotiation system has in many cases 
raised labor costs above a free-market outcome in small, new and labor-intensive firms, and 
analogously lowered labor costs in large incumbent firms. This fact can be expected to lower 
the likelihood that small firms become large firms that eventually pay higher wages 
(Audretsch, 2002).  
 
Finally, as already pointed out in section 2, there were comprehensive impediments to foreign 
ownership of Swedish firms and Swedish real estate. In practice, these rules precluded 
extensive foreign ownership of Swedish companies until the late 1980s. Given this 
characterization of the Swedish policy package vis-à-vis firm ownership and financing, one 
should expect an increased role for large, capital-intensive firms and domestic institutional 
ownership. 
 
3.3  Resulting ownership and control structure 
 
The combined effect of taxation on capital gains, wealth, profits and dividends forcibly 
discouraged individuals from owning firms before the 1990/91 tax reform and from wealth 
accumulation in general. Moreover, the tax system encouraged debt financing, which can be 
expected to benefit large capital-intensive firms with close ties to specific financial 
institutions. We have also pointed to some other policies that are likely to be conducive to a 
development towards large-firm dominance and few and financially weak owners. Does 
observed outcome square with these expectations? 
 
                                                           
10 Davis and Henrekson (2000) discuss these issues more fully.    16 
 
 
Figure 3 demonstrates that the expected change in ownership structure actually took place: 
during the post-war period, the household ownership share of listed stock fell sharply from 75 
percent in 1950 to 18 percent in 1990, while the institutional share rose commensurately.  
 
From the perspective of the individual household, the fact that the tax code enhanced the 
accumulation of retained earnings in firms implied that existing corporate wealth owned by 
households was locked into incumbent firms.
11 According to traditional financial theory in the 
Modigliani-Miller tradition, such within-firm saving should be translated into household 
wealth through appreciated stock-market values. In practice, matters did not turn out this way. 
Until the early 1980s, stock-market values were extremely depressed,
12 which in most cases 
implied that the net worth of Swedish companies greatly exceeded their stock-market value. 
Södersten (1984) calculated that Tobin´s q (the stock-market value of the firms divided by 
their replacement value) was approximately unity in 1960 and that it fell to 60 percent in 1970 
and further to 30 percent in 1980. When Tobin’s q is below unity there is no incentive to 
finance investment through new share issues, since it implies wealth destruction. At the same 
time, there are strong incentives to use internally generated funds to finance investments in 
incumbents firms, when taxation is high on funds withdrawn from existing firms. As shown in 
Figure 4, new equity issues (including IPOs) fell to negligible levels during the postwar 
period up through the mid 1980s.  
 
Another indication of low market values is given by the price-earnings ratios for large 
Swedish companies. The p/e-ratios for firms like Ericsson, Electrolux and Volvo were 
typically between 2 and 4 in the 1970s. Since the regulatory and policy environment induced 
a development towards increased institutional ownership, the stock-market boom which 
began in 1979–80 did not fuel household wealth accumulation to any large extent. 
 
The combined effect of the tax code and credit market regulations also provided strong 
incentives to transfer ownership of closely held firms to institutionally owned investment 
companies closely connected to a bank. Credit availability was crucial, since debt financing 
                                                           
11 Deferred tax payments (“hidden reserves”) were typically as large as total equity in listed companies in the 
1980s (Josefsson, 1988). 
12 David and Mach (2002) report that stock market capitalization was only 3 percent of GDP in Sweden in 1975 
compared to 12 percent for Germany, 30 percent for Switzerland and 48 percent for the US.  The figure reported 
for Sweden in Figure 2 is higher, which might be due to different sources.   17 
 
 
was so heavily subsidized by the tax system.
13 As documented by Petersson (2001) a second 
wave of bank-connected investment companies were formed in the first half of the 1960s. He 
documents that the six largest of those investment companies made a total of 111 acquisitions 
in the period 1962–89, most of them in the 1960s. Likewise it became rational for traditional 
industrial companies to expand through purchases of closely held companies.   
 
These tendencies were also reflected in the development of the industry structure and the size 
distribution of firms. First, the industry distribution of employment and output tilted towards 
industries that were characterized by large firms and establishments and a compressed wage 
distribution (Davis and Henrekson, 1997, 2000). Second, there is plenty of evidence 
indicating that the relative importance of large firms became greater in Sweden than in any 
other country. Henrekson and Johansson (1999) provide an evaluation of the available 
evidence.
14 The mirror image of this fact is that the rate of self-employment became low. 
Since the early 1970s until 1990, Sweden exhibited the lowest ratio of nonagricultural self-
employment to civilian employment among all OECD countries (OECD Employment 
Outlook, July, 1992). The European Observatory for SMEs (1995) reported that Sweden had a 
lower self-employment rate in 1992 than any of the then 12 member countries of the 
European Community (EC). The Swedish self-employment rate was found to be less than 
one-half the EC average.  
 
Finally, while available data are fragmentary, there is some evidence to suggest that Sweden 
experienced low rates of new firm formation until the mid to late 1980s. Braunerhjelm and 
Carlsson (1993) calculate annual entry rates from 1920 to 1991 of new manufacturing firms 
with more than one employee. Their series show that rates of new firm formation in the 
Swedish manufacturing sector had became extremely low by the 1950s; it fell from 
approximately 4 to 2 percent from the 1920s to the 1950s. The annual entry rate fell further to 
1.5 percent in the 1970s, and the average entry rate was even lower in the 1980s. Glete (1994) 
shows that in the period 1965–90 hardly any new industrialists who built their wealth on 
innovative industrial production or distribution emerged. 
 
                                                           
13 From the mid 1960s to the mid 1980s, the debt-equity ratio in listed firms increased from slightly more than 
unity to 4 (Josefsson, 1988). 
14 The share of employees in the private sector working in firms with at least 500 employees increased from 27 
percent in 1964 (SOU 1967: 7) to 47 percent in 1993 (NUTEK, 1995).   18 
 
 
As expected, given the legal impediments, the foreign ownership share also remained low: the 
foreign ownership share of listed stock never exceeded 8 percent through the 1980s and less 
than 5 percent of private sector employees worked in foreign-owned companies. 
 
Hence, it is clear that the expected development of ownership, financing structure, size 
distribution of firms and industry distribution took place. However, the disincentives to 
private wealth accumulation and household ownership of corporate stock did not result in a 
control deficit or an increased tendency to managerial control (Berle and Means, 1932). The 
widely cited government commission on Ownership and Influence in Private Industry (SOU 
1968: 7) identified 17 important ownership groups/families in 1963.
15 Within the next few 
years ownership concentration increased considerably and by 1967 the Wallenberg family 
alone controlled 10 of the 25 largest companies (Glete, 1994, p. 289). Still individual wealth 
was modest by current standards. Total privately held wealth among the members of the 
Wallenberg family in 1963 was estimated to be SEK 125 million (SOU 1968: 7), which 
corresponded to 0.14 percent of GDP. This can be compared to the estimated wealth of the 
Kamprad and Rausing families, founders of IKEA and TetraPak. Their respective wealth was 
on the order of 8 percent of Swedish GDP in 2001.
16  
 
How could control be upheld and even reinforced given the tax code? This was achieved 
through a number of capital-saving control devices, notably, dual-class shares, pyramiding 
and cross-ownership. This will be explained in full in section 5 below. At any rate, in the late 
1960s the Swedish corporatist model reached its apogee, and at the time a handful of 
ownership groups represented by identifiable individuals had crystallized. In fact, 
concentrated ownership control was a necessary condition for the model to function, or in the 
words of Reiter (2003): 
 
In much the same way as the close ties between MITI and the keiretsu-system have been at the 
centre of the Japanese development, the Swedish corporatist model was built on similar 
arrangements between the state, banks (their investment companies), and large-scale export-
                                                           
15 The then leader of the Communist party C.-H. Hermansson had already coined the expression “the fifteen 
families” in his 1962 book Monopol och storfinans (Monopoly and Big Business). According to him these 
fifteen families controlled Swedish industry. The government commission also identified fifteen families and 
two bank-connected groups. 
16 These families left Sweden in the 1970s. Kamprad and one branch of the Rausing family are residents of 
Switzerland. In 2002 they were ranked 1
st and 2
nd in terms of individual wealth in Switzerland. The individual 
wealth of today’s richest family in Sweden, the Persson family (founders and controlling owner of H&M) was   19 
 
 
oriented enterprises. The importance of the Saltsjöbaden Agreement of 1938 between the 
representatives of employers and employees lie not with the contents of the agreement per se, but 
rather in the resulting creation of a central institutional arrangement for Swedish industrialisation. 
The emergence of a concentrated ownership structure has been an important, not to say absolutely 
necessary, element of the economic policy, since it gave the Social Democratic Party an 
identifiable counter-part in the country’s process of export-oriented industrialisation and the 
construction of the welfare state.  
 
This made the tripartite model function smoothly for a while. However, the truce was to be 
broken by more radical currents that gained strength in the labor movement around 1970. 
 
3.4  The first attack on the model: The wage-earner funds proposal 
 
By the late 1960s there was thus already an unusual concentration of ownership control in 
Swedish industry, an industry dominated by large firms. Schumpeter (1942) asserted that in 
an economy that is increasingly dominated by giant corporations and devoid of entrepreneurs, 
capitalism has no constituency. Instead, capitalism will have to confront increasing hostility. 
Eventually, a democratic and peaceful transformation of the economy to socialism would take 
place. It was indeed the case that the popular support for capitalism was extremely low in 
Sweden by the mid to late 1970s.
17  
 
Consistent with Schumpeter’s thesis, the labor movement was strongly radicalized in the early 
1970s. This was reflected in two ways: open demands for the socialization of control rights in 
the enterprise and a quest for increased influence by pressing for legislation in their favor 
(Stephens, 1979). During the 1970s, the blue-collar workers’ trade union, The Swedish Trade 
Union Confederation (LO), was very successful in inducing the government to take a number 
of legislative measures aiming at giving labor direct influence on corporate decision 
making.
18 Prime examples are union representation on corporate boards of directors and the 
Codetermination Act (Medbestämmandelagen, MBL) of 1976 (see Pontusson, 1992). The 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
roughly 2 percent of GDP in 2002. Special legislation passed in the mid 1990s has exempted this and other 
super-rich families from wealth taxation on their stock holdings. 
17 In 1978 only 30 percent of the respondents in a poll believed that it was important to encourage 
entrepreneurship and firm formation and only 37 percent of the respondents believed that business 
leaders/entrepreneurs were most efficient in running a firm, see Henrekson and Jakobsson ( 2001). 
18 In addition, labor strengthened its relative position during this period by legislation on job security, 
substantially increased power to the local trade union safety officer, extended rights for elected trade union 
officials to get paid time off from work for trade union activities etc.   20 
 
 




Such demands had from time to time surfaced within the labor movement even earlier on. 
Already in 1961 the LO discussed a proposal to introduce so-called branch equalization funds 
(branschutjämningsfonder), where high-profit firms should be forced to set aside part of the 
pay increase from which they abstained as a result of solidarity bargaining. Such funds were 
seen as a means to avoiding the consequences on the wealth distribution following from a 
solidaristic wage policy (LO, 1961). A first important step towards increased collective 
ownership was taken in 1974 when a fourth National Pension Fund (Fjärde AP-fonden) was 
introduced with the aim of investing in the stock market. Until then the National Pension 
Funds had been totally banned from equity investments. 
 
Explicit demands for increased collective ownership on a much grander scale were voiced at 
the 1976 LO Congress where Rudolf Meidner and his colleagues presented a plan for an 
inexorable transfer of ownership from private hands to collective ”wage-earner funds” – see 
Meidner (1978). This can be interpreted as a concrete plan for materializing Wigforss original 
vision to convert the large corporations to “social enterprises without owners”.  
 
The wage-earner fund scheme entailed a gradual transfer of ownership of all firms with more 
than 50 employees to wage earners as a collective group. The firms should be obliged to issue 
new shares to the wage-earner funds corresponding to a value of 20 percent of the profits. 
Thus, the transfer of ownership would be more rapid, the more profitable the firm. 
Incidentally, assuming a rate of profit of 10 percent, it would take 35 years for the wage-
earner funds to obtain a majority equity share in the individual company. The wage-earner 
equity thus acquired was intended to remain within the firm as working capital. The voting 
rights and other ownership prerogatives were to be exercised by the trade unions (including 
representatives of other interests in society.
20 
 
                                                           
19 This also became the ideological line of the Social Democratic party. When the then party leader Olof Palme 
presented the new party platform in 1975, he explained that the Swedish labor movement was moving to the 
third stage of its long struggle to transform capitalist society. The first two stages were political democracy and 
co-determination, and the third stage was economic democracy. 
20 It is interesting to note that this form of socialization was in line with Schumpeter’s (1942) prediction of 
“laborism” as the last stage of capitalism.   21 
 
 
These explicit proposals to infringe on private ownership implied that the labor movement 
broke away from the compromise struck in the late 1930s. In due course therefore, the wage-
earner fund proposals met unprecedented opposition from capital owners.
21 Leading Swedish 
capital owners literally took to the streets. On October 4, 1983 capital owners rallied across 
the country in defense of the right to retain ownership and control of their firms. Moreover, 
the original Meidner proposal never gained full acceptance within the Social Democratic 
Party and subsequent joint proposals from LO and the Social Democratic Party were less 
radical than the original plan. Politically, any proposals were blocked from being carried out 
until the Social Democrats returned to power in 1982. At this stage the public opinion had 
shifted against wage-earner funds, but under pressure from LO the government introduced a 
considerably watered-down version of wage-earner funds in 1984. The five wage-earner 
funds thus introduced were financed by a 0.2 percent pay-roll tax and a 20 percent tax on real 
profits above SEK 1 million. Most importantly, the build-up of the wage-earner funds was 
restricted to seven years. The funds were abolished in 1992 by the non-socialist government 
coming to power in the election of 1991.  
 
A fundamental consequence of the wage-earner fund battle was a dismantling of the 
controversy on the ownership issue. There were no more serious demands for a 
collectivization of corporate control and ownership. On the other hand, the tax system was not 
reformed in order to facilitate the emergence of new individually held corporate wealth.  
 
4.  A New Regulatory Environment 
 
During the 1970s the major industrial countries witnessed a renaissance of the liberal market 
economy. It was precipitated by many factors, including disappointment at the results of 
extensive public intervention in the west and the failure of the planned economies in the east.
 
These developments, along with the first signs of collapse of the socialist economies in the 
Eastern bloc, would have led to increasing isolation if Sweden had continued on a socialist 
course. 
 
The long period during which large firms had predominated while small firms had been 
increasingly marginalized came to an end in the late 1970s. Entrepreneurship experienced a 
                                                           
21 The wage-earner funds were probably important also in that they provided the igniting spark for the 
mobilization among Swedish industrialists in defense of private ownership and entrepreneurship, see Blyth   22 
 
 
global resurgence. The decrease in the average size of firms in the industrialized countries 
since the 1970s has been documented by, e.g., Brock and Evans (1986), Loveman and 
Sengenberger (1991) and Acs (1999). There are several reasons why this occurred. Some of 
them are: (i) technological change in recent decades has resulted in a dramatic reduction in 
transaction costs in the market, which has led to increased specialization across firms and 
sharper focus on each firm’s core activity (Carlsson, 1999); (ii) there has been a sizeable shift 
towards service industries where establishments and firms tend to be smaller; (iii) small 
entrepreneurial firms can often act as crucial agents of change and if such firms are motivated 
to grow they are likely to play a particularly important role in the growth process (Acs, 1984; 
Audretsch, 2002). As a result, growth is often manifested by the expansion of small 
entrepreneurial firms with viable business concepts (Birch and Medoff, 1994).  
 
These changes in the underlying structural and technological conditions thus dislodged the 
underpinnings of Schumpeter’s theory and Wigforss’ vision. Somewhat belatedly relative to 
the leading countries Sweden embarked on a comprehensive reform track. First, the capital 
markets were reformed in a number of steps. This is outlined in Table 5. Without going into 
details we note that domestic credit markets were fully deregulated by 1986 and the 
deregulation of capital markets, including restrictions on foreign ownership, was completed in 
1993. 
 
The earlier tax-favoring of debt financing presupposed strictly regulated capital markets. 
However, the tax system remained virtually unchanged while capital markets where 
deregulated, creating an asset-price bubble in the latter half of the 1980s (Jonung, 1994; 
Norrman and McLure, 1997). The tax system was eventually reformed in 1990/91.
22 The 
corporate tax rate was cut in half in 1991 and is now 28 percent, which favors equity-relative 
to debt financing. The introduction of a uniform 30 percent flat capital income tax rate and the 
abolition of wealth taxation on unlisted stock in 1992 favored individual equity investments 
relative to the earlier situation. The highest marginal tax rate has been lowered from close to 
90 percent around 1980 to roughly 55 percent in 2002. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(2001) for a discussion. 
22 Agell, Englund and Södersten (1998) provides a detailed examination of the tax reform.   23 
 
 
In a series of reforms between 1985 and 1994, the distortions in tax wedges across different 
owners and sources of finance were to a large extent evened out. After 1995, the differences 
in tax wedges increased once again, largely following the previous pattern. See Table 6. 
 
When the restrictions on foreign ownership were lifted, the focus shifted to the relative 
treatment of foreign and Swedish owners. The new system represented a significant step 
towards neutrality among Swedish owners. However, the tax burden on Swedish individual 
ownership remained heavier than the tax burden on individual ownership in most other 
countries. 
 
The fact that the tax burden varies in accordance with the tax rules in the respective owner’s 
home country has to be taken into account when analyzing the new situation. It is probably 
reasonable to assume that roughly the same tax wedges as in Sweden apply to tax-exempt 
institutions. Table 7 reports a representative tax calculation for different owners using the 2002 
tax code. The fact that individuals are disfavored relative to institutions is once again evident. 
This also applies relative to foreign institutions. Moreover, it is clear from Table 8 that a large 
number of countries have a lower level of taxation of shareholdings for individuals than 
Sweden. Hence, the combined effect of foreign and Swedish taxation is a favoring of all kinds 
of foreign ownership relative to Swedish individual ownership. The more favorable tax 
situation of foreign owners implies that their pre-tax required rates of return can be lower than 
those of Swedish owners (except for Swedish tax-exempt institutions), i.e., foreign owners, 
ceteris paribus, can pay a higher price for Swedish corporate assets than Swedish (rival) 
owners.  
 
Some deregulatory measures on the labor market have also been taken. In 1997 a new type of 
employment contract was allowed, so-called prearranged temporary employment, which gives 
every firm an unconditional right to employ up to five persons for a maximum of one year. 
Another 1997 change made it possible to sign local collective agreements that replace the 
regulations in the law. This makes it possible, through local agreements, to annul tenure-based 
orders of priority in case of dismissal and to annul the right to reemployment for dismissed 
workers, and to extend the duration of temporary employment beyond 12 months. In 2001 
firms with no more than 10 employees were allowed to except two employees from the “last-
in – first-out” rule in case of redundancies. In practice, this gives some more room for 
flexibility than before. A law passed in 1993 paved the way for an expansion of temporary   24 
 
 
work businesses and staffing services. These firms expand at a rapid rate and already employ 
close to one percent of the workforce in the private sector. 
 
Several previously regulated product markets have also been deregulated, e.g., 
telecommunications (1993), electricity (1996), domestic airlines (1992), the financial sector 
(1993) and postal services (1993). In addition, EU membership in 1995 and the generally 
increased integration of product and capital markets have contributed to the undermining of 
the old corporatist model. 
 
5.  Ownership and Control through the Late 1990s 
 
We noted in section 3.3 that the Swedish corporatist model reached its apogee in the late 
1960s. Industry was dominated by a small number of identifiable actors and agreements could 
be struck between elites. Although one outcome of the wage-earner fund battle was a broad 
acceptance of private ownership of the industrial sector, policies with respect to taxation,  
savings and labor legislation continued, albeit to a lesser extent than before, to promote a 
development towards institutionalized ownership, increased predominance of large capital-
intensive firms and higher debt-equity ratios. 
 
However, as we will document below the concentration of control rights continued to increase 
in firms listed on the Stockholm stock exchange until the late 1990s. The most important 
control mechanisms used are been dual-class shares, pyramiding and cross or circular 
ownership. The use of dual-class shares to ensure concentrated control increased strongly 
after the mid 1960s – see Table 9. During the quarter century from 1968 to 1992 the 
percentage of listed companies using dual class shares increased from 32 to 87 percent. By far 
the most common voting right differential is one to ten – roughly 95 percent of all firms with 
dual class shares in 1998 had a one to ten voting differential (Agnblad et al., 2001). 
Historically, a voting differential of one to thousand was allowed. In 2002, Ericsson is the 
only company still having such a large differential (no other listed firms had a differential 
exceeding one to ten in 2002).
23 
 
                                                           
23 The possibility of issuing shares with a one to thousand voting differential was abolished in 1944, but the 
companies who already enjoyed this extreme voting differential were allowed to retain the old system.   25 
 
 
The most important means for wielding control of the largest firms have been (and in many 
cases still are) closed-end investment funds organized as pyramid holding companies. These 
investment companies enjoy a privileged tax status. Capital gains and dividends on their 
holdings are tax exempt. The only tax levied is a flat tax on the net worth of total holdings at 
year’s end.
24 This is currently 1.5 percent, but new legislation in 2003 will make investment 
companies wholly tax exempt as long as the voting rights in their respective holdings exceed 
10 percent. As already noted the most important of these investment companies were started 
in the aftermath of the Kreuger crash and as a result of new legislation that prohibited banks 
from owning stock. As shown by Petersson (2001) a second wave of new investment 
companies were formed in the first half of the 1960s. They all had close ties to specific banks 
and in a detailed analysis of six of them Petersson documents a total of 111 acquisitions of 
mostly medium-sized family-owned firms in the 1962–89 period. In some cases large firms 
were acquired; 19 of the acquisitions were firms with more than 500 employees. In 1971 there 
were as many as 19 investment companies listed on the stock exchange (Lindgren, 1994b). 
This development was inevitable given the extent to which the tax system penalized 
individual ownership of firms. During this period a great many entrepreneurs sold their firms 
to investment companies or to other large firms and emigrated.
25 
 
The deregulation of domestic capital markets in the 1980s (see Table 5) provided ample 
opportunities for new actors on the ownership market – the unique position of bank-connected 
ownership groups was quickly undermined. Requisite capital could be mobilized for 
(sometimes hostile) takeovers, asset-stripping et cetera. New fortunes could all of a sudden be 
created in other sectors and subsequently be used as a basis for value-creating stockmarket 
activities. During the 1980s there was also an explosion of takeover activity. In the 1950s 
there was roughly one corporate takeover per year in the Swedish stock market. This 
increased to an annual average of three in the 1960s, and four in the 1970s (Isaksson and 
Skog, 1994). In the period 1980 to 1992 there were 253 takeover bids among firms where 
both the bidder and the target were listed on the Stockholm stock exchange, and 212 of those 
bids were successful (Agnblad et al., 2001). 
 
                                                           
24 This tax can be avoided in full if the investment company pays dividends to its owner that are at least as large 
as the sum of the dividends received and the flat tax. 
25 Lindkvist (1990) finds that 30,000 Swedes who emigrated in the 1965–89 period were granted permission by 
the Swedish central bank to export capital from Sweden.    26 
 
 
In order to fend off these new threats, cross-holding arrangements emerged. Cross-holdings 
hardly existed in the 1970s, but rapidly gained in importance during the 1980s: In 1988 there 
were 26 cases among listed companies of cross- or circular ownership, where the companies 
involved held at least two percent of each other’s voting rights (Isaksson and Skog, 1994). In 
particular Volvo was involved in intricate cross-holding arrangements with several investment 
companies but also including the leading construction company Skanska and the steel and 
engineering firm Sandvik.  
 
Despite deregulation of credit markets in the 1980s the use of dual-class shares, pyramiding 
and the numerous takeovers led to a substantial increase in the concentration of ownership 
control – the average voting power of the largest single owner in listed companies increased 
by roughly 15 percentage points from the late 1970s until 1991. In the 165 firms with voting-
right differentials of 1 to 10 in 1991, the largest owner on average held a voting share of 53 
percent (Isaksson and Skog, 1994).
26  
 
Following the removal of all foreign exchange controls and all barriers to foreign ownership 
of Swedish firms and real-estate, a number of  changes ensued. First, the foreign ownership 
share of listed shares began to increase rapidly. As shown in Figure 5 the foreign ownership 
share went from 7 percent in 1989 when foreign exchange controls were lifted to 40 percent 
ten years later. Domestic institutions lowered their share almost as much when they were 
given the opportunity to diversify their portfolios internationally. Although it should be noted 
that the foreign ownership share decreased somewhat again in 2001–2002 following the sharp 
drop in the valuation of firms in the IT sector. 
 
Even more importantly, as shown in Figure 6, the number of employees in wholly foreign-
owned companies (in most cases wholly-owned subsidiaries or branches to foreign 
multinationals) has grown rapidly in Sweden over the last two decades. In 1980, 
approximately 113,000 Swedes were employed in foreign firms. By 2001, this figure had 
risen to 520,000 and more than one out of five employees in the business sector (21 percent) 
worked for a foreign firm (ITPS, 2002).
27 Until the late 1980s, foreigners established and 
                                                           
26 The capital ownership share averaged 35 percent. 
27 The trend is similar in all industrialized countries, but much more pronounced in Sweden. From the mid-
1990s, inward FDIs are very large in Sweden both in an absolute sense and compared to other countries. On 
average, they corresponded to 55 percent of total gross investment. This figure may be compared to a   27 
 
 
expanded their own activities in Sweden. But after ASEA merged with Brown Boveri in 
1987, to become a Swiss-based company, many – often very large – Swedish firms have been 
acquired by foreign owners.
28  
 
Thus, foreign owners have strengthened their control of the Swedish corporate sector 
considerably through the acquisition of Swedish firms. In terms of total activity most of this 
increase concerns acquisition of firms listed on the Stockholm stock exchange controlled by 
Swedish owners.
29 However, the control of the listed firms became even more concentrated at 
least until the late 1990s. Agnblad et al. (2001) provide a detailed analysis of the control 
situation among the 304 listed firms in late 1998. At that point the largest shareholder on 
average controlled 38 percent of the voting rights, in 34 percent of the firms the controlling 
owner has more than 50 percent of the votes and 82 percent of the firms had a well-defined 
owner with more than 25 percent of the votes, which in practice implied operational control of 
the firm. Hence, the typical firm has one clearly identified controlling owner. In most cases 
the controlling owner was a family or a single individual (62 percent of all listed firms). 
 
IPO (Initial Public Offering) activity also gradually became very intense in Sweden, 
beginning in the early 1980s. Holmén and Högfeldt (2002) report 352 new listings on the 
Stockholm stock exchange between 1979 and 1997. The number of new listings in the years 
1998–2001 was 35, 54, 62 and 24, respectively. Hence, there was a virtual explosion of IPOs 
in the late 1990s. This activity came to an almost complete standstill after the burst of the IT-
bubble and in 2002 the number of IPOs was just 10. Among the 352 IPOs examined by 
Holmén and Högfeldt, 69 percent of the firms were family or individually controlled. The 
private owners in control normally retained all shares with high-voting power (A-shares), and 
on average they kept 68.5 percent of the voting rights after the IPO. If the firm remained 
intact after five years and if it had not suffered severe financial problems, the original owners 
still retained 2/3 of the votes five years after the IPO. If sold, control blocks are always sold 
wholesale in a block transfer or at the time of takeover in order to protect control rents 
(Bebchuk et al., 1999).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
corresponding level of 31 percent in Ireland, the country which is usually mentioned in this context (UNCTAD, 
World Investment Report and OECD, Employment Outlook). 
28 The predominance of foreign ownership is particularly evident in the pharmaceutical industry, with an 
ownership share of 86 percent.   28 
 
 
Considering the control of the market value rather than firms, it becomes important to focus 
on the largest firms. Here investment companies organized as pyramid holding companies 
become important vehicles for control. Following the profound changes in the tax system in 
the early 1990s most of the investment companies were gradually dismantled. However, two 
of them, Investor and Industrivärden, gradually strengthened their control even further. 
Investor is privately controlled by the Wallenberg and Industrivärden is institutionally 
controlled by a management team closely tied to Handelsbanken. Agnblad et al. (2001) report 
that in 1998 Investor, i.e., the Wallenberg sphere, controlled 14 large listed firms with a 
market value making up 42 percent of the total market capitalization at the Stockholm stock 
exchange. With an ownership share of 19.4 percent (41.3 percent of the votes) the Wallenberg 
foundations had total control of Investor. Investor’s share of the total market capitalization 
was in turn 4.6 percent. Hence, the Wallenberg foundation’s ownership of approximately 1 
percent of the total market value of the stock exchange was sufficient to control 42 percent of 
the total market value (see Figure 7).  
 
Similarly, the Handelsbanken sphere, through Industrivärden, controlled 11 listed companies, 
which constituted 12 percent of the total market capitalization. Jointly the two ownership 
spheres thus controlled 54 percent of the total market value, using two closed-end funds with 
a combined market value of 6.2 percent of the stock exchange. 
 
In summary, in the late 1990s the Stockholm stock exchange was characterized by an extreme 
separation of ownership and control as a result of the combined effect of dual-class shares and 
pyramiding. In particular, it is evident that the Wallenberg were much more proficient than 
other well-established families in taking advantage of the ownership vacuum brought about 
by far-reaching institutionalization of ownership during the postwar period (Lindgren, 1994a, 
b). Moreover, it is evident that founders of firms that go public with few exceptions manage 
to retain full control of their firms, and, consequently, external investors have been willing to 
acquire sizable ownership rights without demanding any influence.  
 
This extreme division of ownership and control is explained by an apparent contradiction 
between the way tax policy and corporate laws have treated owners of individual wealth. The 
main objective of tax policies in this area have been to curtail the accumulation of individual 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
29 Henrekson and Jakobsson (2002) document that roughly 30 listed companies were sold to foreign owners from 
the ASEA-Brown Boweri deal in 1987 until the end of 2000.   29 
 
 
wealth, while corporate law has provided ample opportunities for entrepreneurial individuals 
or families to base the control of a firm on a relatively small amount of capital.  
 
The structure of incentives has gone against private wealth formation while concentrated 
control has been promoted. These incentives have had a profound impact on the norms of 
Swedish capitalists and entrepreneurs. In this section we have seen that the most powerful 
Swedish capitalists to a considerable extent are prepared to forego wealth in order to gain 
control. In the next section we shall see that this pattern also is prevalent among smaller 
Swedish entrepreneurs.  
 
6.  The Swedish Ownership Model at the Crossroads 
 
In the previous section we have documented that the Swedish corporate sector is characterized 
by tight control – typically one owner or family controls the company and this tends to persist 
long after the firm has gone public. In fact, this pattern is just a manifestation of strong 
revealed preferences for control among Swedish entrepreneurs/business owners in general. 
The seminal study here is Davidsson (1989). In his study of 400 firms with 2–20 employees 
in four industries he finds that when growth is expected to lead to loss of control for the 
founder, this has a strong growth-deterring effect. Wiklund, Davidsson and Delmar (2002) 
follow up on this study by looking at a larger sample of firms in the mid 1990s (1248 firms 
with 5–49 employees). The old pattern is repeated: In order to give priority to growth the 
entrepreneur finds it important not to lose control and independence to other stakeholders. In 
both these studies entrepreneurs emphasize the importance of the well-being of their 
employees for the decision to expand.
30 
 
Cressy and Olofsson (1996), in a study of 285 Swedish firms in 1993 with 5–199 employees, 
hypothesize that problems with equity financing of growing firms may not just be a supply 
problem, it could just as well be a demand problem in that the entrepreneurs may be reluctant 
to cede control in exchange for requisite equity financing even if this leads to considerably 
improved growth prospects. Strong support for this hypothesis is found. In all size classes 
retained earnings is preferred to other equity financing, and hence firms become highly 
dependent on profitability in order to be able to grow. Moreover, 44 percent of the 
                                                           
30 Saemundssson (1999) looks specifically at university spinoffs, where he finds a similar pattern. These firms 
are often unwilling to grow if that results in a loss of control and independence.   30 
 
 
entrepreneurs say that they would prefer to sell the whole company rather than sharing control 
with new co-owners. The authors conclude (p. 63) that ”the firms themselves are aware that 
relinquishing some control would improve performance. However, it seems that the returns in 
growth, profits and survival are not sufficient to ensure that the needed transfer of shares takes 
place.”  
 
Berggren, Lindström and Olofsson (2000) follow up on the earlier study by Cressy and 
Olofsson. In a study of 281 Swedish firms the previous pattern is repeated. Retained earnings 
is considered the most important source of finance and the reluctance to cede some control to 
outside investors makes it very difficult to grow for firms with little current profits. 
Furthermore, those firms where the founder and his/her family have a lower ownership share 
are more likely to grow rapidly, and the larger the number of ownership categories in the firm, 
the more likely the firm is to grow rapidly.
31 
 
In a similar vein, Holmén and Högfeldt (2002) find that family owned firms with large growth 
potential tend to be undercapitalized relative to comparable firms with a different control 
structure. As a result, the family-controlled firms invest less than the comparable firms, since 
the equity requirements would reduce family control of the firm.
32 
 
This revealed preference for control relative to growth is quite consistent with an institutional 
environment that makes it very risky to aim at rapid growth, and, moreover, with a regulatory 
package penalizing individual wealth accumulation, the opportunity cost for foregoing growth 
is lowered.  
 
There are many indications that the observed “control culture” is detrimental to growth and 
economic dynamism in the corporate sector. It is illuminating to compare this culture with the 
one that seems to be dominating in successful clusters in the US economy. A typical feature 
of US venture capitalism is that the entrepreneur that has started up a firm is bought out by the 
venture capitalist at an early stage of the life-cycle of a firm.
33 While the entrepreneur looses 
control he or she often gets very wealthy through the buyout and the selling of his remaining 
stock when both the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur exit in an IPO (Gompers and 
                                                           
31 This is in line with studies from other countries, see Storey (1994). 
32 This is consistent with the findings by Morck et al. (2000) on Canadian data. They find that firms where 
control has been inherited grow more slowly than comparable firms with a dispersed ownership structure. 
33 Empirical evidence of this process is given in Hellman and Puri (2002).   31 
 
 
Lerner, 2001). The entrepreneurs as well as the venture capitalist typically use their acquired 
wealth by investing in new projects. Obviously, this is a model that could be expected to be 
more conducive to start ups and new firm growth than the Swedish model where the 
entrepreneur often clings to the control of his start up throughout his entrepreneurial career. 
 
Empirical observations clearly confirm this expectation. Not a single one of the 50 largest 
firms in Sweden in 2000 was founded after 1969 (Figure 8). This may be compared to the 
very different situation in the US in recent decades, where new and fast-growing firms are 
generating not just most of the jobs but also the new industries (Audretsch and Thurik, 2000). 
In 2002 roughly 40 percent of the 50 largest firms were founded no later than 1970. 
 
Let us now turn to the current and likely development of the control structure in the large-firm 
sector. The Wallenbergs are currently waning in importance. In 1998 Investor controlled 14 
large listed firms (Agnblad et al., 2001). In late 2002 Investor retained a voting share 
exceeding 20 percent in just seven listed firms (Ericsson, Saab, WM-Data, Atlas Copco, 
Electrolux, Gambro and SEB) and they had a voting share of 15 percent in Scania and 17 
percent in OM. Except for Investor and Industrivärden (and to a lesser extent Kinnevik) the 
numerous investment companies have either vanished completely through asset-stripping or 
been downsized through share redemption schemes or a transfer of the shares in individual 
companies directly to the share holders of the investment company on a pro rata basis. As a 
result, investment companies are losing in importance as control vehicles on the Swedish 
stock market. 
 
There are several reasons for this development. First, the shares of investment companies 
trade at a significant discount relative to the net portfolio value of their assets. This is no 
recent phenomenon. As shown in Figure 9 Investor has always traded at a discount relative to 
the net value of its assets. At times this discount has been as high as 40 percent. Although the 
discount has seldom been this high for other investment companies, the average discount over 
longer time periods has been roughly 20 percent (Högfeldt and Synnerstad, 1999). The 
discount implies that there is a negative valuation of the management services provided by the 
investment company, since the portfolio itself has a higher value without these services.  
 
As long as the investment companies trade at a discount, they cannot issue new equity. Given 
that the overall stock market is growing, it is therefore virtually impossible for them to expand   32 
 
 
their resources in tandem with the growth of the aggregate market. Second, their control is 
often based on historical holdings of A-shares with great voting power. A-shares in other 
firms are often hard to come by, and when barred from the issuance of new equity, the best an 
investment company can do is to retain control of its historical holdings. Third, investment 
companies are not fully tax exempt; a flat tax of 1.5 percent of its net asset value at year end 
is levied. This tax can be avoided if the investment company pays large dividends to its 
shareholders, but that weakens its potential for retaining control even more.
34 Fourth, the 
companies controlled by means of a high-voting share and small capital share have suffered 
from low valuation. In two spectacular cases (Electrolux and SKF), this has already forced 
Investor to voluntarily reduce the voting rights of the A-shares from 1000 to 10 (Reiter, 




In many cases, and in the case of the Wallenbergs in particular, the power is tied to share 
holdings by a family foundation at the top of the pyramid. The family foundations are tax 
exempt, but as a prerequisite for tax exemption, family foundations are obligated to donate 80 
percent of their dividend income to charity. This not only diminishes their financial strength, 
but it is also suspiciously similar to a tax – except that the foundation is able to determine how 
the “tax” will be used. Apart from being fully tax exempt on capital gains, family foundations 
are also financially strained by this obligation to, and hence they can hardly generate means to 
expand as rapidly as the overall stock market. Furthermore, the system generates incentive 
problems. When dynastic ambitions cease to serve as a sufficiently strong incentive, family 
foundations would no longer be able to maintain their competence as owners to the same 
degree as those who can freely dispose of their returns. 
 
Globalization of asset markets tend to penalize owners of firms with a large wedge between 
control rights and cash flow rights more than before when the Swedish stock market was 
mainly an affair for domestic investors (Giannetti and Simonov, 2002; Denis and McConnell, 
2003). When the stock market was largely domestic, dual-class shares enabling highly reputed 
owners to exercise active ownership with less capital was often seen as an efficient means to 
                                                           
34 Effective from 2003 this tax can be largely avoided since it will not be levied on holdings where the 
investment company’s voting share is at least 10 percent. 
35 In the case of Electrolux this measure reduced the voting share of the Wallenberg sphere from 94 to 25 
percent. In 2002 the chairman of Ericsson established a group, consisting of representatives from the main   33 
 
 
protect shareholders against X-inefficiency that, supposedly, could follow from more 
managerial discretion (Bergström and Rydqvist, 1990).  
 
When the playing field is levelled across investors and sources of finance, the tax incentives 
for low dividends and financing through retained earnings go down. This spurs the valuation 
of firms and it once again becomes attractive to finance expansion by issuing new stock. The 
choice for the old owners now becomes very difficult: They either have to refrain from rapid 
expansion, thereby foregoing business opportunities and/or risking a takeover bid, or they 
have to dilute their own ownership share and control rights.  
 
7.  The Future Ownership Model: Obstacles and Challenges 
 
From the analysis in the previous two sections it is clear that the traditional Swedish 
ownership and control model is currently under attack. First, a progressively larger share of 
savings is channeled to institutions, as the result of a number of factors: a larger proportion of 
the pension system is funded and voluntary pensions saving schemes are greatly favored by 
the tax system. Second, the central government has stopped selling out its stock holding and it 
has emerged as the largest owner on the Stockholm stock exchange with more than 8 percent 
of total holdings (February, 2002).
36  Third, investment companies cannot raise capital 
through equity issues, and hence they are doomed to decrease in relative importance over 
time. Fourth, institutional investors become increasingly unwilling to accept dual-class shares, 
thereby putting pressure on listed firms to reduce the differential between cash-flow and 
control rights.  
 
In Appendix 1 we list total assets of state and corporatist pension funds as of mid 2002. It is 
clear that their assets are very large relative to the total stock market; their total assets 
exceeded 50 percent of the total market capitalization of the Stockholm stock exchange, and 
given the all-encompassing pensions saving schemes, these funds are bound to increase in 
importance as a source of finance relative to other sources.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
shareholders, that during the first half of 2003 shall work out the details on the transition from a voting right 
differential of 1000 to 10.    
36 In fact, the current Minister of Industry, Mr Leif Pagrotsky (TT interview, Nov. 2, 2002), argues in favor of a 
larger state ownership share in order to compensate for what he considers to be inferior ownership competence 
and short-termism among private actors in recent years.   34 
 
 
So what is the likely future for the Swedish ownership and control model under current 
circumstances? It is hard to see that any one model will supersede the traditional control 
model. Instead a number of new ownership models are likely to gain in importance at the 
expense of the old model: 
 
1.  Foreign ownership. In this case Swedish firms become subsidiaries to foreign-owned 
firms, typically large multinationals. 
2.  Dispersed ownership. In this case the firm may have both Swedish and foreign owners, 
where no owners can exercise substantial control. This is likely to lead to management 
control. 
3.  Corporatist or state pension funds as control owners. This is a likely model in a number 
of cases in the future, since these funds together with the government are the largest 
owners on the stock exchange. 
4.  Entrepreneur backed by corporatist funds or the government. This model is a highly 
likely variant of model number 3. In particular, in a time of crisis for a particular firm it is 
easy to conceive of situations where government and corporatist money lines up with 
trusted individual investors or a private group.  
 
Thus, the ownership and control of large firms is currently facing a number of challenges. At 
the same time, there are still large impediments to rapid growth among small firms. In 
particular, the new “pension-fund capitalism” that is emerging presupposes that the tax 
system makes room for the emergence of tax-efficient performance contracts that induce, 
entrepreneurs, portfolio managers and venture capitalists to behave as though they invested 
their own private money. However, the use of stock options to encourage and reward 
entrepreneurial behavior among employees is highly penalized by the tax system, since gains 
on options are taxed as wage income when the stock options are tied to employment. Thus, 
they are subjected both to mandatory social security (33 percent) and the marginal tax rate. 
Since the marginal tax rate is roughly 57 percent this entails a total tax rate of 68 percent in 
2002.
37  
                                                           
37 This stands in stark contrast to the US where an employee who accepts stock options can defer the tax liability 
to the time when the stocks were sold rather than when the options were exercised. In general, there are (i) no tax 
consequences to the employee upon the grant or the exercise of the option; (ii) the employee is taxed at capital 
gains rates when the stock acquired upon the exercise of the option is sold after a specified holding period; and 
(iii) there is no deduction available to the employer. This change in the law shifted the tax risk in the options 
back to the government, and thus accomplished two things: it increased the potential profit from the stock   35 
 
 
In practice, stock options can therefore not be used as a means to reward entrepreneurial 
behavior among wealth-constrained individuals. Neither can they be used efficiently to 
reward venture capitalists or portfolio managers who invest in venture capital firms. Venture 
capital firms can play a crucial role in the development of a small entrepreneurial venture by 
converting high-risk opportunities to a more acceptable risk level through portfolio 
diversification, and adding key competencies that the firm may be lacking. This is achieved 
by means of developing arrangements that align the incentives of the three agents – investors, 
venture capitalists and entrepreneurs (Zider, 1998; Gompers and Lerner, 2001; Kaplan and 
Strömberg, 2001). However, the above described tax schedules apply to this industry as well, 
which means that a venture capital industry domiciled in Sweden cannot use high-powered 
incentives to reward investment managers.
38 
 
8.  Conclusions 
 
We have documented that corporate control in Sweden has been highly concentrated; even 
among listed companies most firms have been controlled by a single individual or a single 
family. Given an overall policy disfavouring private wealth accumulation and new firm 
formation this appears paradoxical at first glance. However, this model was an integral part of 
a Swedish corporatist structure that presupposed a highly concentrated control structure in the 
business sector and given the overall policy this necessitated a growing disparity between 
control rights and cash-flow rights for the dominant owners. A number of devices have been 
used to achieve this, the most important of which have been dual-class shares and pyramiding 
with tax-favoured closed-end investment funds as the prime control vehicle.  
 
Thus, the Swedish corporatist model shows a number of similarities with corporatist models 
on the European continent, but there are also traits that are unique for Sweden. First, the 
concentration of corporate control in Sweden became higher than in other European countries. 
Second, the equity on which the control is based is thinner in Sweden than in other corporatist 
European economies (Agnblad et al., 2001). This latter trait makes the Swedish model of 
control especially vulnerable to the threats posed by globalization and the increasing 
dominance of pension funds on global stock markets. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
options and it allowed budget-constrained individuals to sell stocks whenever they chose to do so (Misher, 
1984). 
38 See Henrekson and Rosenberg (2001) for a fuller exposition of this issue.   36 
 
 
A major threat to the Swedish model emerged in the late 1970s, when the proposals to 
introduce wage-earner funds gained considerable popular support. According to the most far-
reaching proposals this would have led to a complete, albeit gradual, trade-union takeover of 
the whole Swedish business sector excepting the very smallest firms. In hindsight, the 
ideological battle that ensued marked the endpoint of the socialist vision that had been so 
important in Swedish politics for decades. Following the dismantling of the wage-earner 
funds, numerous market-oriented policy reforms were implemented and demands for 
socialization of the private sector were removed from the Social-Democratic political agenda. 
 
However, in the long run the new more market liberal order undermined the traditional 
Swedish corporate control model. Paradoxically, this might lead to a situation where a large 
part of the control of the private sector becomes collectivised. Since the mid 1980s politically 
or trade-union governed funds have grown rapidly. Their financial resources are becoming 
extremely large relative to other ownership groups. Moreover, the total international openness 
of the market for corporate control makes it increasingly difficult for traditional control 
owners to retain control based on a tenuous capital base. The loss of control will for the most 
part take either of two forms: sale of entire firms mostly to foreign owners and the voluntary 
reduction of control rights as a response to pressure from minority investors who are 
increasingly unwilling to accept large differentials between control and cash-flow rights. 
 
Are there any ways out of the ”ownership control vacuum” that is becoming apparent in 
Sweden, and for that matter in many other countries, when savings are progressively 
channelled to large pension funds and when the public pension systems become increasingly 
funded rather than just pay-as-you-go? No doubt, there is an inherent problem involved, but a 
number of things can still be done.  
 
First, savings can be “deinstitutionalized” so that large part of the pension wealth becomes 
available for equity investments in entrepreneurial firms. Second, the current discrimination 
of individual ownership could be removed. That is likely to increase the supply of firms in 
which pension funds and other financial institutions can invest.
39 Third, large closed-end 
funds of fixed duration may be formed with the express purpose of buying a controlling share 
in listed companies that are poorly managed. The managers/partners of these funds are then 
                                                           
39 As emphasized by Gompers and Lerner (2001), the factor limiting growth of entrepreneurial firms is seldom 
lack of capital, but the limited supply of potential candidates for venture capital financing.   37 
 
 
paid on a performance basis. Various arrangements of this kind are beginning to emerge in 
order to make up for the control deficit when ownership becomes increasingly 
institutionalized. Similarly, it is easy to conceive of the emergence of ownership specialists 
who, based on contract, exercise the voting rights of the stock holdings of a number of funds 
in a specific company for a specified period of time. In this way, a single actor may achieve 
enough control rights to be able to carry out value-enhancing actions. We find it unlikely that 
a capitalist system can preserve its dynamism without forceful individual entrepreneurs and 
the continual creation of new large family fortunes. Later in life, such entrepreneurs tend to be 
instrumental in the provision of angel capital.  
 
To sum up, we have shown that the traditional Swedish ownership and control model is about 
to lose its dominant position and that a number of different control paths are likely to emerge. 
None of them is without its problems. The current quandary is not unique for Sweden, 
however. Similar problems characterize most of Continental Europe. A major challenge for 
the near future is to find new ways of ascertaining the existence of actors that can assume 
successfully the ownership role in the corporate sector.    38 
 
 
Appendix 1  Assets and Domestic Stock Market Investments by State and Corporatist 
Pension Funds, Sweden 2001–2002. 
 





Sate and corporatist funds
Billions of SEK
June 30, 2002
AFA Försäkring*  22.8 161.5
Alecta*  70.5 300.9
AMF Pension*  44.3 185.9
Andra AP-fonden*  23.8 124.3
Banco Fonder  8.2
Fjärde AP-fonden*  27.8 121.8
Folksam Försäkring  7.2
Första AP-fonden*  15.8 123.7
KP Pension och försäkring*  7.5 43.4
Länsförsäkringar  12.2
Länsförsäkringar fonder  6.5
Nordea fonder  44.1
Robur fonder  74.3
SEB fonder  41.3
SEB-Trygg försäkring  18.6
SHB fonder  33.0
Sjätte AP-fonden*  8.8 15.4
Skandia  41.6
Skandia Carlson fonder  9.0
SPP livförsäkring  10.5
Tredje AP-fonden*  20.5 126.6
Sjunde AP-fonden*  21.9
FSO  13.5
Total domestic funds  548.3
Total stock market capitalization  2511.0
Ownership share domestic funds %  21.8
Total assets state and corporatist funds, 
June 30, 2002 
1238.9
Investment capacity of state and 
corporatist funds as a share of total stock 
market capitalization, June 30, 2002 
more than 50%
*Denotes a state or corporatist pension fund. 
Source: Sundin and Sundqvist (2002, p. 32).   
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Table 1  Stylized outline of ownership policy and structure in Sweden during the post-war 
period. 
 
  Phase I (1945–1985)   Phase II (1985–) 
Ideological 
superstructure 
Long-run vision of a socialist 
economy; Marx, Schumpeter, 
Wigforss. 
Ambiguous combination of market 
liberalism, adjustment to EU and anti-
capitalism. 
Policy in practice  Aimed at discouraging individual 
wealth accumulation, stimulating 
institutional ownership, favoring 
large companies, impeding small and 
new firms. Strong obstacles to 
foreign ownership. 
Deregulation and greater market 
orientation. Removal of obstacles to 
foreign ownership. Fiscal 
discrimination of Swedish ownership. 
Resulting ownership 
structure 
Strong increase in institutional 
ownership and corresponding decline 
in individual ownership. 
Strong increase in international 
ownership and corresponding decline 
in Swedish institutional ownership. 
Corporate control  “Swedish Ownership Model”  “Swedish Ownership Model” 
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Table 2  Effects of policy design on ownership, firm structure and financing in the business 
sector in the post-war period, phase I (1950–1985) and phase II (1985–). 
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 Table 3  Effective marginal tax rates for different combinations of owners and sources of 
finance, 1960, 1970, 1980 and 1985 (real pre-tax rate of return 10% at actual 
inflation rates). 
 




1960   
Households 27.2 92.7 48.2 
Tax exempt institutions  –32.2 31.4 31.2 
Insurance companies  –21.7 41.6 34.0 
      
1970   
Households 51.3 122.1 57.1 
Tax exempt institutions  –64.8 15.9 32.7 
Insurance companies  –45.1 42.4 41.2 
      
1980   
Households 58.2 136.6 51.9 
Tax exempt institutions  –83.4 –11.6 11.2 
Insurance companies  –54.9 38.4 28.7 
      
1985   
Households 46.6 112.1 64.0 
Tax exempt institutions  –46.8 6.8 28.7 
Insurance companies  –26.5 32.2 36.3 
Note: All calculations are based on the actual asset composition in manufacturing. The following inflation rates 
were used: 1960: 3%, 1970: 7%, 1980: 9.4%, 1985: 5%. The calculations conform to the general framework 
developed by King and Fullerton (1984). The average holding period is assumed to be 10 years. A negative tax 
rate implies that the rate of return after tax is greater than before tax. For instance, a tax rate of –83 percent for a 
debt-financed investment owned by a tax-exempt institution in 1980 tells us that a real rate of return of 10 
percent before tax becomes 18.3 percent after tax. 
Source: Södersten (1984). 
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Table 4  Household net saving as a share of disposable income in Sweden, OECD and 
OECD Europe, 1960–89 (per cent). 
 
 1960–69 1970–79 1980–89 
Sweden 6.1 4.0 1.1 
OECD 9.7 12.1 11.2 
OECD Europe  12.0 13.6 11.6 
 
Sources: OECD, Historical Statistics 1960–1980 and 1960–1995.   47 
 
 
Table 5  The major steps in the deregulation of Swedish capital markets. 
  
 
Permission for corporations and municipalities to borrow abroad  1974 
Deregulation of banks' deposit rates  1978 
Deregulation of interest rate on corporate bonds  1980 
Deregulation of lending rates by insurance companies  1980 
Banks granted permission to issue CD's  1980 
Liquidity ratios for banks are abolished  1983 
Deregulation of banks' lending rates  1985 
Loan ceiling on bank lending lifted  1985 
Marginal placement ratios for banks and insurance companies abolished  1986 
Relaxation of foreign exchange controls on stock transactions  1986–88 
Remaining foreign exchange controls lifted  1989 
Removal or annulment of:   
Regulation of establishment of foreign banks' branches   1990 
Regulation of foreign acquisition of shares in Swedish commercial banks, 
broker firms and finance companies 
1990 
Regulation of establishment of financial institutions other than banks  1991 
The act on foreign acquisition of Swedish companies  1992 
Trade permit requirement for foreigners  1992 
Restrictions in the articles of associations regarding foreigners’ right to 
acquire shares in Swedish companies 
1993 
The payments services act  1993 
Source: Reiter (2003), Henrekson (1992) and, Jonung (1994). 
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Table 6  Effective marginal tax rates for different combinations of owners and 
  sources of finance, 1980, 1994 and 2001 (10% real pre-tax rate of return at 
  actual inflation rates). 
  Debt New share issues Retained earnings 
1991   
Households 31.7 61.8 54.2 
Tax exempt institutions  –9.4 4.0 18.7 
Insurance companies  14.4 33.3 31.6 
      
1994   
Households 32.0/27.0† 28.3/18.3† 36.5/26.5† 
Tax exempt institutions  –14.9 21.8 21.8 
Insurance companies  0.7 32.3 33.8 
      
2001   
Households 29.7/24.7† 61.0/51.0† 44.1/34.1† 
Tax exempt institutions  –1.4 23.6 23.6 
Insurance companies  19.6 47.2 44.7 
†Excluding wealth tax; the wealth tax on unlisted shares was abolished in 1992. 
Notes: The calculations conform to the general framework developed in King and Fullerton (1984). The average 
holding period is assumed to be 10 years. 
Source: Calculations provided by Jan Södersten; see Södersten (1993). 
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Table 7  Taxation of dividends for different owner categories according to the 2002 tax code 









Corporate tax  280  280 280 280 
Income tax  216  90 0 0 
Wealth tax  120  0 0 0 
Net return  384  630 720 720 
Tax rate (%)  62  37 28 28 
Notes: The household is assumed to pay full wealth tax (on 80% of the market value) on its shareholdings. An 
individual foreign owner has the same tax burden as a foreign investment fund in those countries where there is 
no wealth tax on shareholdings and where dividends are taxed at the firm level only; cf. Table 4. 
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Table 8  Some important aspects of the taxation of shareholders in selected industrialized  
countries, 2000. 
No taxation of 
dividends at the 
owner level 
No wealth tax  Low wealth tax/large 
exemptions and/or low/no 
taxation of dividends 
No capital gains 
tax on long-term 
holdings 
Capital gains tax > 
0 but ≤ 20% on 
long-term holdings 
Finland Austria  Finland  Austria Ireland 
France Australia*  France  Belgium  Italy 
Germany Belgium  Luxembourg  Denmark Japan 
Greece Canada  Portugal  Germany  Luxembourg‡ 
Italy Denmark  Spain  Greece  Norway 
Luxembourg Germany  Switzerland  Korea*  Poland 
New Zealand*  Greece  Luxembourg  Spain 
Norway Ireland  Mexico* U.S.A. 
Spain Italy  Netherlands   
U.K. Japan  Poland   
Netherlands† Portugal   
New Zealand  U.K.#   
Poland    
Portugal    
U.K.    
U.S.A.    
Notes: #Large exemption. †Effective as of 2001. ‡50% of the income tax rate, i.e., a maximum rate of 23%. 
*Pertains to 1999. The definition of ”long-term holdings” varies between 3 months and 5 years. In some 
instances the situation refers to a representative case. 
Sources: The Federation of Swedish Industries, Institutet för Utländsk Rätt and European Tax Handbook 
(published by KPMG). 
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Table 9  The percentage of listed companies on the Stockholm stock exchange with dual 
class shares, selected years 1968–1998. 
Year Share  No.  of  firms   Year Share No.  of  firms 
1968 32  146   1986 74 217 
1972 36  134   1992 87 202 
1977 44  130   1998 63 304 
1981 54  128      
Source: Bergström and Rydqvist (1988), Isaksson and Skog (1994) and Agnblad et al. (2001). 
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Figure 1  Aspects of the Swedish ownership model. 
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Figure 2  Stock market capitalization on the Stockholm stock exchange as a share of  
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Source: Daniel Waldenström and Statistics Sweden. 
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Figure 3  The distribution of ownership of Swedish listed shares across ownership 


















Source: Spånt (1975), Norrman and McLure (1997), Statistics Sweden and OM Stockholm Stock Exchange. 
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Figure 4  Total volume of new equity issues on the Stockholm stock exchange as a share of 
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Note: Concerns the sum of new issues by already listed firms and IPOs. 
Source: Own calculations based on data from Althaimer (1988), Annual reports from the OM Stockholm stock 
exchange and Statistics Sweden. 
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Figure 5  Distribution of ownership of Swedish listed shares across ownership categories, 















Source: Statistics Sweden and OM Stockholm Stock Exchange. 
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Figure 6  Employees in foreign-owned firms in Sweden and their share of all employees in 
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Source: Strandell (2000) and ITPS (2002). 
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Source: Investor AB, Annual Report 1999. 
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Figure 9  Discount on Investor AB’s share price relative to net asset value 1930–2002  
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Source: Lindgren (1994b) and Investor AB. 
 
 